The Specter of Nihilism: On Hegel on Buddhism by D\u27Amato, Mario & Moore, Robert T.
Rollins College
Rollins Scholarship Online
Student-Faculty Collaborative Research
1-1-2011
The Specter of Nihilism: On Hegel on Buddhism
Mario D'Amato
Rollins College, mdamato@rollins.edu
Robert T. Moore
Rollins College
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.rollins.edu/stud_fac
Part of the Religious Thought, Theology and Philosophy of Religion Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Rollins Scholarship Online. It has been accepted for inclusion in Student-Faculty
Collaborative Research by an authorized administrator of Rollins Scholarship Online. For more information, please contact wzhang@rollins.edu.
Published In
D'Amato, Mario and Moore, Robert T., "The Specter of Nihilism: On Hegel on Buddhism" (2011). Student-Faculty Collaborative
Research. Paper 28.
http://scholarship.rollins.edu/stud_fac/28
The Specter of Nihilism: 
On Hegel on Buddhism 
 
                        Mario D’Amato and Robert T. Moore∗ 
 
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831) is renowned 
as one of the most complex and comprehensive modern 
philosophers. The goal of his philosophical system is nothing less 
than to explain the interrelationships among all the multifarious 
aspects of the whole of reality, including the entire array of 
historical religions. But Hegel’s dialectical method has been 
criticized as being speculative and idealistic, and his interpretation 
of religion has been written off by some as an overly ambitious 
attempt to force the historical religions into the confines of a 
predetermined hierarchical scheme. As for his perspective on 
Buddhism, Hegel interprets it as a form of nihilism, stating that for 
Buddhism, “the ultimate or highest [reality] is…nothing or not-
being” and the “state of negation is the highest state: one must 
immerse oneself in this nothing, in the eternal tranquillity of the 
nothing generally” (LPR 253).1 Hegel’s interpretation of Buddhism 
has of course been appropriately criticized in recent scholarship, 
most ably by Roger-Pol Droit in his work The Cult of Nothingness: 
The Philosophers and the Buddha (2003). In this essay, however, 
we will reconsider Hegel’s perspective on Buddhism. While we do 
not believe that Buddhism is properly characterized as a form of 
nihilism, we do believe that a significant insight may be found 
through examining Hegel’s philosophical interpretation of 
Buddhism. In short, we will argue that while Buddhism is not itself 
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1  Following the system used by Kolb 1992, “LPR” followed by a page 
number designates a page in the one-volume edition of Hegel’s 1827 
Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion (Hegel 1988); “LPR” followed by a 
Roman numeral and a page number designates a volume and page in the 
three-volume edition of Hegel’s Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion 
(vol. I: Hegel 1984; vol. II: Hegel 1987; vol. III: Hegel 1985). 
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a form of nihilism, nihilism is the specter that continues to haunt 
Buddhism. 
While Hegel is one of the most notable figures of modern 
philosophy, it is perhaps less frequently noted that Hegel’s 
philosophical activity was contemporaneous with the formation of 
Buddhism as an object of study in western academia. Though 
Buddhism had previously been studied by Europeans—primarily 
missionaries—before the early nineteenth century, the western 
study of the religion had been rather fragmentary and fragmented. 
The understanding that a number of distinct Asian religious 
practices (“cults,” “forms of idolatry,” etc.) comprised one single 
religion was not generally integrated into western scholarship until 
the early nineteenth century.2 In 1817 Michel-Jean-François 
Ozeray published Recherches sur Buddou ou Bouddou, “one of the 
very first works in the French language in which the term 
‘bouddisme’ appears, to denote the ‘religion of the Bouddou,’” 
thus marking a relevant date for the constitution of this “new object 
of current curiosity and of future studies” (Droit, 2003:37-38).3 
And it is only some five years after the publication of this work 
that Hegel first lectured on Buddhism, in his course on the 
philosophy of history. Hegel was undoubtedly the most prominent 
early nineteenth-century philosopher to systematically analyze 
Buddhism, and he did so precisely at a time when the academic 
study of the religion was developing in the west. 
It is, nevertheless, the case that Hegel’s interpretation of 
Buddhism developed in the context of previous western 
interpretations of the religion. Though the term Buddhism was not 
in use until the early nineteenth century, western knowledge of the 
religion dates back to at least the sixteenth century, with the letters, 
accounts, and analyses of Jesuit missionaries, which were 
                                                 
2  Almond states that while there were earlier intimations that “various 
culturally diffuse religious phenomena…had apparent relationships with 
each other,” it was in the 1820s that “this congeries of religious phenomena 
throughout Asia [was] being classified as the religion of Buddha or 
Buddhism” (1988, pp. 8 and 10; cf. Droit, 2003: 75-76). Droit states, 
“Before the beginning of the nineteenth century, there was no clearly 
defined system attached to the Buddha’s name” (2003: 27). 
3  Similarly, the Oxford English Dictionary specifies that the term Boudhism 
was first used in an English journal publication in 1801, and that the term 
Buddhism first occurs in 1816. 
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published in annuals and disseminated widely throughout Europe.4 
According to Offermanns, “A close reading of sixteenth century 
missionary letters indicates that Jesuits of that period already knew 
more, in particular concerning Buddhism as a lived tradition, than 
many an Orientalist of the nineteenth century” (2005, p. 17). One 
notable work by a Jesuit drawing from these missionary sources 
was Jean Baptiste Du Halde’s four volume Description 
Géographique, Historique, Chronologique, Politique, et Physique 
de l'Empire de la Chine et de la Tartarie Chinoise (first published 
in French in 1735, and in English in 1736). In this work Du Halde 
offers a nihilistic interpretation of Buddhism, stating: 
“They teach that a Vacuum or Nothing is the Principle 
of all things…that it is from Nothing…that all things 
are produced, and to which they all return…[so] to live 
happily we must continually strive by Meditation, and 
frequent Victories over ourselves, to become like this 
Principium, and to this end accustom ourselves to do 
nothing, to desire nothing, to perceive nothing, [and] to 
think on nothing… (Du Halde 1736, vol. 3, pp. 50-51)”. 
This passage resonates quite noticeably with Hegel’s 
interpretation of Buddhism.5 In fact Droit argues that Hegel 
developed his interpretation of Buddhism through relying on dated 
Jesuit missionary sources, rather than consulting more recently 
available studies, precisely because the Jesuit sources more readily 
conformed to Hegel’s own nihilistic perspective on Buddhism 
(2003: 65). However, Hegel did not exclusively rely on older 
                                                 
4  See Offermanns 2005, pp. 17-18. There was contact between India and the 
west dating back to the ancient period, but de Jong indicates that the first 
known western contact with Buddhism occurred in the thirteenth century, 
when Franciscan and Dominican friars were sent to the Mongols (1997: 15). 
Then in the sixteenth century, missionaries went to China, Japan, India, and 
Southeast Asia, and the information on Buddhism acquired by these 
missionaries was recounted in letters sent back to Europe. But de Jong states 
that “it is difficult to get a clear idea of the extent and the accuracy of the 
information on Buddhism that reached Europe in the sixteenth to eighteenth 
centuries” (1997: 17). 
5  Consider this passage from Hegel’s Philosophy of History: “Nothingness is 
the principle of all things…all proceeded from and returns to 
Nothingness…To obtain happiness, therefore, man must seek to assimilate 
himself to this principle by continual victories over himself; and for the sake 
of this, do nothing, wish nothing, desire nothing” (1956: 168-169). 
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sources; he also made use of more recently available works.6 
Nevertheless, Halbfass is correct that Hegel’s “historical and 
philological accuracy and objectivity…leave much to be desired”; 
but he also rightly points out that Hegel’s “philosophy commits 
him to not being neutral,” and that Hegel’s interpretation of Indian 
religion “is a matter of intense historical and systematic reflection” 
(1988: 84-85). Our focus, then, is not on the analysis of Hegel’s 
sources, but on the reassessment of Hegel’s philosophical 
interpretation of Buddhism. But in order to do this, it will first be 
necessary to consider Hegel’s dialectical method, and his overall 
interpretation of religion. 
 
Hegel’s Dialectic 
On Hegel’s own account, the purpose of his dialectic is to 
provide a definitive method for philosophy, so that philosophy 
could become “an objective, demonstrated science” (Hegel 
1969:28)—without a clear method, philosophy could never attain 
scientific status. Unlike the method of the empirical sciences, 
however, the dialectical method must be able to account for the 
whole of reality, rather than just one specific domain, since the 
object of the study of philosophy is the whole: “The True is the 
whole” (Hegel 1977: 11). As Mure states, Hegel’s philosophy aims 
to demonstrate that reality is a “necessarily ordered whole wherein 
the elements ordered are the phases of a single timelessly self-
constituting activity which is mind or spirit” (1984: 296). And it is 
the function of the dialectic to explain the manner in which the 
“self-constituting activity” of spirit unfolds. 
Fundamental to Hegel’s conception of the dialectic is the 
view that concepts contain their own negation. The basic dialectic 
involves the synthesis of two dichotomous elements, wherein each 
of the dichotomous elements or “moments” contains a self-
contradiction. The movement of the dialectic then in some way 
overcomes the contradiction inherent in each element. This whole 
process is referred to by Hegel as Aufhebung, sometimes translated 
as “sublation.”7 Thus the Hegelian Aufhebung is a process of 
                                                 
6  Further information on Hegel’s sources is provided by Hulin (1979: 122-
124) and Hodgson’s extensive “Bibliography of Sources for Hegel’s 
Philosophy of Religion” (at LPR 503-526). 
7  It is interesting to note that the verb aufheben has three main senses: “(1) ‘to 
raise, to hold, lift up’ (2) ‘to annul, abolish, destroy, cancel, suspend’ (3) ‘to 
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combining opposed states and sublating them into something 
higher: “What results from the sublation of something, e.g. the 
whole in which both it and its opposite survive as moments, is 
invariably higher than…the item(s) sublated” (Inwood 1992: 284). 
Forster summarizes the process as follows: “Beginning from a 
category A, Hegel seeks to show that upon conceptual analysis, 
category A proves to contain a contrary category, B, and 
conversely that category B proves to contain category A, thus 
showing both categories to be self-contradictory. He then seeks to 
show that this negative result has a positive outcome, a new 
category, C (sometimes referred to as the ‘negative of the negative’ 
or the ‘determinate negation’)” (1993: 132). So the basic dialectic 
may be understood as a combination and unification, as well as a 
negation, of two prior moments into a third. 
We may further understand the Hegelian dialectic by 
considering a significant example of its application, i.e., the triad of 
being, nothing, and becoming. Hegel states that “Being, pure 
being, without any further determination…is pure 
indeterminateness and emptiness…Pure being and pure nothing 
are, therefore, the same” (1969: 82). Mure explains that “Pure 
Being is, we may say, the very vanishing-point of 
characterization…in so far as the Absolute just positively is and no 
more, it has no determinate character—it is not” (1982: 131). Thus 
the category of being may be seen to contain the contrary category, 
nothing. The contradiction inherent in both being and nothing is 
then sublated (negated, unified) by becoming. This precise 
example, the first one laid out in Hegel’s Science of Logic, is quite 
relevant to our analysis of Hegel’s interpretation of Buddhism. In 
fact, in his discussion of being in the Encyclopaedia Logic, Hegel 
states, “The Nothing which the Buddhists make the universal 
principle, as well as the final aim and goal of everything, is the 
same abstraction” (1892: 161). 
Before turning to Hegel’s interpretation of religion 
generally and Buddhism specifically, we would emphasize two 
important points regarding Hegel’s dialectic. First, following 
                                                                                                              
keep, save, preserve’” (Inwood 1992: 283). And each of these meanings 
reflects the intent of Hegel’s dialectical method in some way: “Earlier stages 
of a temporal, developmental process are sublated in (to) later stages: e.g. 
earlier philosophies are both destroyed and preserved in Hegel’s 
philosophy” (Inwood 1992: 284). 
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Forster and Hodgson, we do not take the Hegelian dialectic to 
present a predetermined structure into which various phenomena 
must be forced, but rather believe that it should be approached as a 
tool for analysis, a productive interpretive method that is intended 
to explain phenomena “once they are empirically known,” and not 
in a manner completely independent of human experience (Forster 
1993: 140); as Hodgson states, the “basic movement of Hegel’s 
philosophy is from the empirical or experiential…to the rational or 
logical” (1988: 6)—hence Hegel’s dialectic must begin with 
empirical data. Second, also following Forster, we believe that the 
dialectical method should be understood as “the core of a grand 
hypothesis—concerning the structure of our shapes of 
consciousness, our categories, and natural and spiritual 
phenomena” (1993: 140). So the dialectical method is the key to 
understanding Hegel’s hypothesis regarding the way in which 
religions have unfolded in human history. 
 
Hegel on Religion 
To set up the context for Hegel’s views on Buddhism, we 
must consider his philosophy of religion as a whole. The primary 
source for Hegel’s interpretation of religion is his Lectures on the 
Philosophy of Religion, which is comprised of material from 
Hegel’s course on the topic, a course he offered four times—in 
1821, 1824, 1827, and 1831—during his tenure as chair of 
philosophy at the University of Berlin.8 It is no surprise that the 
                                                 
8  Other significant sources for Hegel’s interpretation of religion are his Jena 
Lectures on the Philosophy of Spirit, in which he “began to construct a 
philosophical system, experimenting with a number of approaches” 
(Hodgson 2005: 29); his Phenomenology of Spirit, which “belongs to 
another [earlier] stage of development” (Jaeschke 1990: 209); the section on 
religion in the three versions of his Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical 
Sciences, Part III: Philosophy of Mind, which comprises only eight 
paragraphs in the 1830 edition; the Lectures on the History of Philosophy, 
which discusses Chinese and Indian philosophy, but does not address 
Buddhism; the Philosophy of History, which comments on various historical 
religions; and his Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art, which discusses Indian 
religion in relation to symbolism, but does not refer to Buddhism. Jaeschke 
states that “the Berlin lectures of 1821, 1824, 1827, and 1831…for the first 
time develop the philosophy of religion of the system in the full sense” 
(1990: 209); for his extended argument in favor of the priority of the 
Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, see pp. 209-211. Our list excludes 
works pertaining only to the interpretation of Christianity, since our focus is 
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same dialectical unfolding applies to religion as it does to 
everything else, again representing the unity and completeness of 
mind or spirit; as Hegel states, the “whole of philosophy is nothing 
else but a study of the definition of unity; and likewise the 
philosophy of religion is just a succession of unities, where the 
unity always [abides] but is continually becoming more 
determinate” (LPR 127-128). In Hegel’s view, the historical 
religions unfold according to the dialectic elucidated in his 
philosophy, from the most basic form (i.e., magic) to the 
consummate religion (i.e., Christianity). Hegel, however, did not 
come to a definitive interpretation of this process before his death 
in 1831, shortly after the conclusion of his fourth series of lectures 
on the philosophy of religion. In fact, Hegel constantly struggled 
with the question of the precise order in which the religions should 
be placed, as evidenced by the significant changes apparent in the 
four different series of lectures.9 This is probably due at least in 
part to the new information being acquired by Hegel throughout 
the 1820s. However, even with what is known about his final series 
of lectures in 1831, it is evident that Hegel never completed his 
arrangement of the historical religions. This by no means detracts 
from the significance of Hegel’s Lectures on the Philosophy of 
Religion, and if anything militates against the common critique that 
Hegel is too deterministic in his interpretation of religion. As 
Hodgson states, Hegel’s “willingness to incorporate new data and 
experiment with new schemes” implies that his “speculative 
philosophy was a kind of ‘conceptual play’ based on imaginative 
variation of the logical ‘deep structure’ in order to arrive at new 
insights with respect to the myriad, inexhaustible details of nature, 
history, and human experience” (1988: 2). We agree that Hegel’s 
philosophy of religion is best approached as a source for new 
insights in the interpretation of religion. 
The structure of Hegel’s philosophy of religion clearly 
follows the tripartite form of his general system of philosophy, in 
this case as the (1) concept of religion, (2) determinate religion, 
                                                                                                              
on Hegel’s interpretation of religion in general, and Buddhism specifically. 
Discussions of Buddhism may be found in the Lectures on the Philosophy of 
Religion and the Philosophy of History. 
9  In our overview we will follow the interpretation offered in Hegel’s 1827 
lectures, since this is the most developed series for which we have adequate 
material; the 1831 lectures are only preserved in excerpts and fragments; see 
Hodgson’s comments at LPR I 8-20. 
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and (3) consummate religion. These three moments of the dialectic 
may be explained in terms of the three figures of a syllogism: as (1) 
universality (Allgemeinheit), (2) particularity (Besonderheit), and 
(3) individuality (Einzelheit). Hodgson indicates that “this 
syllogistic structure is mirrored in every aspect of Hegel’s 
philosophical system: in the system as a whole (logical idea, 
nature, spirit); in the science of logic (being [immediacy], essence 
[reflection], concept [subjectivity]) and its many subdivisions…in 
the doctrine of the Trinity (Father, Son, Spirit),” and of course in 
Hegel’s philosophy of religion (1988: 5). The first moment, the 
concept of religion, represents universality insofar as it 
encompasses the universal concept of what religion is; determinate 
religion represents particularity insofar as it encompasses the 
specific, particular forms of religion that have occurred in human 
history; and the consummate religion (i.e., Christianity) represents 
individuality, since Christianity sublates the universal concept of 
religion and the particular determinate religions into the higher 
form of the one true, absolute religion. We will further elucidate 
each of these three moments according to Hegel’s account, in order 
to gain a clearer sense of his overall interpretation of religion. 
(1) Concept of Religion: This first moment of Hegel’s 
philosophy of religion is itself comprised of three moments: the 
concept of God, the knowledge of God, and the cultus (worship of 
God). According to Hegel, “God is the absolute substance, the only 
true actuality” (LPR 117). However, Hegel is quick to emphasize 
that “the fact that God is substance does not exclude 
subjectivity…that God is spirit, absolute spirit” (LPR 118). Hence 
God must be properly understood both as substance and as subject, 
and to consider God only as substance is to uphold a form of 
pantheism. When God becomes an object of thought, we arrive at 
the second moment of the concept of religion: knowledge of God. 
Hegel defines this moment as “the standpoint for which God…is 
object of consciousness” (LPR 129), and it is here that he addresses 
the various proofs for the existence of God. But with the 
knowledge of God, the relationship to God remains theoretical, and 
“still lacks the practical element, which comes to expression in the 
cultus” (LPR 189), which is the third moment of the concept of 
religion. While the knowledge of God entails a distinction between 
God and the human person (i.e., a distinction between the object of 
knowledge and the knowing subject), in the cultus (worship of 
God) the distinction is sublated: “In the cultus…is the including, 
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within my own self, of myself with God, the knowing of myself 
within God and of God within me” (LPR 191). 
(2) Determinate Religion: From the concept of religion, 
Hegel delves into the details of the unfolding of the historical 
religions. We agree with Dupré’s assessment of Hegel’s ordering 
of the determinate religions, namely that Hegel’s arrangement may 
be understood “as a typology of religions arranged in an order that 
unfolds the logical conditions required for the very possibility of 
the consummately spiritual religion in which the idea becomes 
fully manifest” (1992: 82)—so the order here is not strictly one of 
historical development, but rather describes the realization of the 
necessary stages for arriving at the one true, absolute religion. On 
Hegel’s account, the threefold structure of determinate religion is 
nature religion, religion which elevates the spiritual above the 
natural, and the religion of expediency (or Roman religion). For 
Hegel, nature religion is “religion defined as the unity of the 
spiritual and the natural, where the spirit still is in unity with 
nature. In being this way, spirit is not yet free, is not yet actual as 
spirit” (LPR 207). Nature religion is nevertheless to be 
distinguished from viewing natural objects as God. According to 
Hegel, “Even in the basest religion the spiritual is…always nobler 
than the natural…nature religion is not a religion in which external, 
physical objects are taken to be God and are revered as God; 
instead it is a religion in which…the spiritual [is recognized] first 
in its immediate and natural mode” (LPR 219). 
The first form of nature religion is the religion of magic, 
according to which the “spiritual aspect” is understood as “the 
power over nature,” where “self-consciousness is a power 
transcending nature” (LPR 226). Hegel sharply distinguishes this 
“spiritual aspect” from the conception of a soul, a realization which 
occurs in a further stage of the development of religion. Hegel 
presents Daoism and the imperial state religion of ancient China as 
highly developed forms of the religion of magic, arguing that the 
latter especially is superior to the lesser religions of magic through 
focusing “not merely [on] the power of nature, but the power of 
nature bound up together with moral characteristics” (LPR 236). 
Nevertheless, Hegel still believes that morality is not inherent to 
Chinese religion, that it exhibits “no immanent rationality through 
which human beings might have internal value and dignity” (LPR 
249); hence it remains at the earliest stage of nature religion. 
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The next two forms of nature religion are Buddhism and Hinduism. 
We will address Buddhism—the religion of “being-within-self”—
in further detail in the next section, but here we will simply note 
that Buddhism is placed at an earlier stage than Hinduism in the 
1827 lectures.10 Regarding the interpretation of Hinduism, Hegel 
believes that Hinduism encompasses Buddhism’s “being-within-
self,” but makes the further move of externalizing the divine 
through a “distinction into many powers…[depicted] as a plurality 
of deities” (LPR 271). This plurality of deities does not negate the 
conception that “the One is God,” but instead gives way to 
“particularizations [which] yield distinct, particular configurations 
or powers” (LPR 269). Basically, the movement is from the 
nothingness of Buddhism to the all-encompassing character of 
Hinduism—a movement from lack or negation, to “the concrete, 
the richness of the world, the particularizing of that universal 
substance,” unifying the spiritual and the natural (LPR 269). As 
Halbfass summarizes Hegel’s view, Indian religions “see God as 
ultimate ‘substance,’ pure abstract being-in-itself, which contains 
all finite and particular beings as non-essential modifications” 
(1988: 88). But as Taylor points out, “this is no closer to the vision 
of God as subject” (1975: 496). Also, Hegel holds that the 
“unbridled polytheism” of Hinduism does not achieve the beauty 
found in Greek religion (LPR 271); in Hegel’s view, Hindu 
conceptions of the divine “are merely fanciful [phantastisch],” 
representing “a wild particularity” (LPR 272). 
The final stage of nature religion includes two religions of 
transition: Persian religion and Egyptian religion. These religions 
are marked by the complete spirituality of consciousness, the 
movement towards “genuine independence…the objectivity of the 
absolute, consciousness of its self-made independence,” wherein 
God is separated from “empirical self-consciousness” (LPR 293-
294). In Persian religion God is equated with the good, which in 
turn is equated with the true, and with “absolute substance” (LPR 
299). However, the good here is understood to be “in conflict with 
evil, so that evil stands over against it and persists as an absolute 
principle” (LPR 301); this idea of the absolute “is unable to 
embrace the antithesis or contradiction within itself and to endure 
                                                 
10  In the 1831 lectures, however, Buddhism is considered to be more advanced 
than Hinduism (see LPR II 735-736); but as noted above, information from 
the 1831 lectures is only fragmentary. 
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it, so it has evil alongside it instead” (LPR 304), just as light must 
have darkness alongside it. In Egyptian religion, however, the 
negative principle is contained within the conception of the divine 
itself: Hegel states that in Egyptian religion, “for the first time we 
have the dying of God as internal to God himself, the 
determination that the negation is immanent in God’s essence” 
(LPR 313). According to Egyptian religion, Osiris is killed, “but he 
is perpetually restored and thus…he is not something natural but 
something set apart from the natural and the sensible” (LPR 314), 
and thus he becomes the ruler both of the living and of the realm of 
the dead. However, in Egyptian religion, “what is sensible and 
natural has not yet been completely transfigured into the spiritual” 
(LPR 326), a stage that would only be achieved in the next moment 
of determinate religion. 
The second moment of determinate religion is the elevation 
of the spiritual above the natural, encompassing Greek religion and 
Judaism. Here the movement is from forms of religion in which the 
divine is understood as immanent in nature, to forms of religion 
that make a sharp distinction between the natural and the 
transcendent. These religions are characterized by “free 
subjectivity,” the complete release of spirit from natural 
boundaries, wherein the empirical world becomes “only a sign of 
spirit” (LPR 329). This movement begins with Greek religion, 
which Hegel refers to as the “religion of humanity,” because here 
for the first time the human is “concretely…portrayed as the 
divine” (LPR 330). The Greek gods have complete power over 
nature, which is a defining aspect of Greek religion for Hegel: “the 
spiritual principle elevated itself…it subordinated the natural to 
itself” (LPR 333). Furthermore, Greek religion is the beginning of 
“rationality or, more precisely, ethical life,” but this is ethical life 
“in its immediacy” (LPR 331), in its earliest stages. Above the 
Greek gods stands fate—the gods are ultimately subject to the fate 
which governs all of reality—and because fate is “a blind necessity 
that stands above all, even above the gods, uncomprehended,” it is 
not rational, since “what is rational is comprehensible” (LPR 339). 
While in Greek religion the gods are constrained by fate, in 
Judaism there is the conception of the “unity of God [containing] 
one power within it, which is accordingly the absolute power” 
(LPR 359), and this represents an advancement on Hegel’s 
account. However, in Judaism, “God himself, the ‘wholly Other,’ 
stands absolutely apart…in the awesome solitude of his own 
The Indian International Journal of Buddhist Studies 12, 2011 34 
ineffable holiness” (Reardon 1977: 52), making him completely 
transcendent, ruling over a world that is entirely separate from the 
divine. 
The final moment of determinate religion—the synthesis of 
nature religion and those religions that elevate the spiritual above 
the natural—is the religion of expediency, or Roman religion. In 
Roman religion, the Greek conception of multiple gods is brought 
together with the Jewish conception of unity, and this unity is then 
connected with the natural aspect of the power of Rome: 
all these gods together, the individual gods, are gathered into one. 
The extension of the Romans’ worldly dominion consisted in this: 
that individuals and peoples were brought under one power and 
rule, and likewise their ethical powers, the divine national spirits, 
were compressed into one pantheon, assembled under one destiny, 
subordinated to the one Jupiter Capitolinus. Whole cargoes of gods 
were hauled to Rome from Egypt, Greece, Persia (the Mithra 
worship), etc. Rome is a potpourri of all sorts of religions; the total 
condition is one of confusion. (LPR 384) 
And this confusion can only be sorted out by the unfolding of the 
consummate religion. It should be emphasized that Roman religion 
in Hegel’s account “is not higher than what has gone before but 
gathers up and makes explicit the limitations of determinate 
religion as such” (Hodgson 2005: 208)—limitations that would 
only be overcome in the consummate religion. And the unfolding 
of the determinate religions is interpreted in terms of the dialectic: 
the determinate religions are “necessary conditions for the 
emergence of the true religion, for the authentic consciousness of 
spirit” (LPR 205). 
(3) Consummate Religion: The final moment of Hegel’s 
philosophy of religion is that of the consummate religion, or 
Christianity. In Christianity, for the first time, “spirit is only for 
spirit” (LPR 393); thus Christianity represents the pinnacle of 
religion, insofar as religion is “spirit that realizes itself in 
consciousness” (LPR 104), i.e., spirit aware of itself as spirit. In 
Christianity, God is conceived as both substance and subject, as the 
sublation of the finite and the infinite, and as the sublation of the 
relationship between the human and the divine: “The reason why 
the Christian religion is for Hegel the consummate religion is that it 
sublates the mere relationship-of-consciousness, according to 
which God stands on the one side while the human worshiper 
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stands on the other” (Jaeschke 1992: 12). Taylor also emphasizes 
the dimension of relationship as crucial to Hegel’s understanding 
of God in Christianity, stating that the trinity may be understood as 
“a play of love in the absolute itself” (1975: 489). Hence, 
Christianity is the consummation of spirit revealing itself to itself. 
This is not to say, however, that Hegel was an orthodox Christian, 
and the “idea that Hegel was a humanistic atheist was briefly 
defended after Hegel’s death by the ‘left’ Hegelians (e.g., Bauer 
and Marx), who saw him as a subtle subverter of Christian faith, 
against the ‘right’ Hegelians, who took Hegel at his word as a 
Lutheran and as a defender of the faith” (Solomon 1987: 58).11 So 
contention arose quite soon after the development of Hegel’s 
philosophical interpretation of religion. 
 
Hegel on Buddhism 
Having considered Hegel’s overall interpretation of 
religion, we may now turn to the details of his interpretation of 
Buddhism. Hegel refers to Buddhism as the religion of “being-
within-self,” and specifies that it is the first religion to understand 
the absolute as substance—“as an essence,” as “power or 
dominion,” which accounts for “the creation and maintenance of 
the world, of nature and of all things” (LPR 251). According to 
Hegel, in Buddhism this substance, the absolute, is understood to 
have its “existence in sensible presence, i.e., in singular human 
beings” (LPR 252)—such as the Buddha Íåkyamuni (the historical 
buddha, born Siddhårtha Gautama). Hegel points out, however, that 
Buddhism entails an “elevation above the immediate, singular 
consciousness…an elevation above desire and singular will” (LPR 
252), and thus implies the “cessation of desire” (LPR 252), which 
is of course a reference to the third of Buddhism’s four noble 
truths: that the cessation of suffering is brought about through the 
cessation of desire (or craving, t®Σˆå Buddhism, then, negates the 
individual human will, and posits that nothing or non-being is the 
highest state, since “everything emerges from nothing, everything 
returns into nothing” (LPR 253). Thus, “human holiness consists in 
uniting oneself, by this negation, with nothingness, and so with 
God, with the absolute,” and the path to nothingness is “to will 
                                                 
11  See Jaeschke (1990: 381-388) for an analysis of the debate between the 
“left” and “right” Hegelians. 
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nothing, to want [nothing], and to do nothing” (LPR 254). The 
attainment of this state is referred to as nirvåˆa. Here we clearly 
see Hegel’s characterization of Buddhism as nihilism. 
For Hegel, however, Buddhism does not just leave us with 
a bleak view of the absolute, and there is certainly something to be 
learned from these negative conceptions. He states: 
More closely considered…[Buddhism’s] characterization [of the 
divine] means nothing other than that God purely and simply is 
nothing determinate, is the indeterminate…God is the infinite. For 
when we say that God is the infinite, that means that God is the 
negation of everything particular…That does not mean, however, 
that God is not, but rather that God is the empty, and that this 
emptiness is God. (LPR 255-256) 
So Hegel does not read Buddhism’s conception of the divine in 
purely negative terms, but views it as a form of apophasis, as a 
means of arriving at the absolute through negating all particular, 
determinate characterizations of the absolute. Indeed Hegel sees 
this same tendency in certain aspects of Christian theology: “When 
we say, ‘We can know nothing of God, can have no cognition, no 
representation of God,’ then this is a milder expression for the fact 
that for us God is the nothing, that for us God is what is empty” 
(LPR 256). Thus, as Droit indicates, “nothingness in Hegel’s 
thinking, the very nothingness that he attributes to the Buddhists, is 
to be understood not as the absolute opposite of Being, but as its 
indetermination” (2003: 67). As we saw in the first triad offered in 
Hegel’s Science of Logic, “Pure being and pure nothing are, 
therefore, the same” (1969: 82). 
Hegel’s statement regarding Buddhism’s negative 
conception of the divine indicates that Buddhism plays a very 
significant role in his general interpretation of religion. For Hegel, 
Buddhism is “a definite and necessary stage of religious 
representation” (LPR 256), because Buddhism’s conception of the 
divine as indeterminate for the first time understands the divine to 
be something other than a particular, determinate being. So while 
Buddhism’s negative conception is not viewed as the pinnacle of 
understanding, it is a crucial moment in the dialectical unfolding of 
religion, and must be properly comprehended. Furthermore, 
Halbfass points out that in Hegel’s view, Indian religion “can 
function as a corrective…. According to Hegel, a major aberration 
of modern Western thought is its excessive subjectivism and 
The Specter of Nihilism: On Hegel on Buddhism 37 
anthropocentrism, its tendency…to lose itself in sheer narcissism,” 
whereas in Indian religion “all vanity is consumed” (1988: 93-94). 
Thus for Hegel, Buddhism represents an important moment in the 
development of religion, and can serve to counteract certain 
narcissistic tendencies in western thought. 
Hegel goes on to discuss another central aspect of Buddhist 
doctrine, i.e., the doctrine of rebirth, or “the dogma of the 
transmigration of souls” (LPR 256). He begins this discussion by 
stating that while in Daoism, the soul or spirit is not understood to 
be intrinsically immortal (one must strive to attain immortality in 
Daoism), in Buddhism “it is known that the soul is immortal” (LPR 
257). While it may seem that Hegel is inappropriately foisting a 
doctrine of åtman (self or soul) on the religion of anåtman (no-self, 
absence of self), it should be kept in mind that on Hegel’s 
interpretation, the “principal cultus” in Buddhism “consists of 
transposing oneself…into the nothing” (LPR 256), and “a human 
being who attains this self-negation, this abstraction, is thus 
exempted from transmigration of souls” (LPR 258); furthermore, 
he states, “When one attains this, there is no longer any question of 
something higher, of virtue and immortality…this pure nothing…is 
the absolutely highest state” (LPR 254). Hence this purported 
“soul” does not exist eternally, but rather is subject to extinction, 
and ultimately should be negated. In fact, on Hegel’s account, the 
highest goal—nirvåˆa—is “a state of annihilation” (LPR 315). 
How then, according to Hegel, should it be understood that 
in Buddhism, the absolute is viewed as existing as a “sensible 
presence in a human being” (LPR 251)? If the highest state is a 
form of annihilation of the individual, then how does the divine 
come to be present in specific individuals, such as the Buddha? 
Hegel addresses this issue by emphasizing that “it is in mediation, 
in preoccupation with self or deep absorption within self, that a 
person is the universal substance” (LPR 264). Because the absolute 
is understood as nothingness, when one withdraws into this 
nothingness through renunciation, one becomes united with the 
divine, or attains unity with the absolute. As Hegel states in the 
Encyclopaedia Logic, “the Buddhists, who make God to be 
Nought…from that principle draw the further conclusion that self-
annihilation is the means by which man becomes God” (1892: 
163). 
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In his interpretation of Buddhism, Hegel also addresses the 
topic of pantheism, which is notable insofar as Hegel himself has 
sometimes been interpreted as a pantheist.12 Hegel states that 
Buddhism “should be understood as the standpoint of ‘pantheism’ 
in its proper sense—this Oriental knowing…of the absolute 
substance” (LPR 260). Pantheistic doctrines were criticized in 
Hegel’s time, and in this discussion Hegel defends Spinoza, a 
thinker whom Hegel admired, and who had been “reproached with 
pantheism” (LPR 262). However, Hegel states that “‘pantheism’ is 
a poor expression” because it is open to a “possible 
misunderstanding” (LPR 263). When misunderstood, pantheism is 
interpreted as the “thoughtless, shoddy, unphilosophical view” that 
“everything is God” [Allesgötterei], rather than the view that “the 
All is God” [Allgötterei] (LPR 261). Furthermore, Hegel 
emphasizes that when it is properly understood, it can be seen that 
pantheism’s “representation of substantiality underlies the 
representation of God in our own religion, too” (LPR 261-262)—
so pantheism prepares the ground for the consummate religion. 
Thus for Hegel, Buddhism begins the process of arriving at a true 
understanding of God, because it is the first religion in which 
“Only God is, only God is the one, genuine actuality” (LPR 261). 
However, Hegel also indicates that Buddhism’s conception of the 
divine as substance is still incomplete: “In all higher religions, but 
particularly in the Christian religion, God is the one and absolute 
substance; but at the same time God is also subject, and that is 
something more” (LPR 263). Hence for Hegel, Buddhism is 
interpreted as a moment—albeit as a necessary moment—in the 
unfolding of the one, true religion. 
 
The Specter of Nihilism 
Roger-Pol Droit’s The Cult of Nothingness: The 
Philosophers and the Buddha begins with the statement, “Let us 
say it straight out: Buddhism is not a religion that worships 
nothingness” (2003: 1). With this simple sentence, Droit seemingly 
dismisses Hegel’s philosophical interpretation of Buddhism.13 
                                                 
12  On Hegel and pantheism, see Williamson 1984: 203-294; Harten 1994: 132-
146; and Viyagappa 1980: 64-77. 
13  Park similarly states, “Needless to say, understanding Buddhism as a cult of 
nothingness leaves much to desire to be an accurate description of the 
tradition,” and argues that Hegel “projects a feminized, castrated, and 
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While we do not hold that Droit’s perspective is necessarily wrong, 
we do believe that Hegel’s interpretation of Buddhism as nihilism 
merits further consideration. We believe that through an 
investigation of Buddhist discourse, one can see that even within 
Buddhism itself there is a concern that Buddhism may be 
misinterpreted as a form of nihilism.14 
The misinterpretation of Buddhism as nihilism is not 
terribly surprising in an initial contact with Buddhist doctrine. The 
basic Buddhist doctrines of anåtman (absence of self) and nirvåˆa, 
at first pass at least, seem to be negative in character: the doctrine 
of anåtman holds that fundamentally there is no self as an abiding 
substance, and the doctrine of nirvåˆa posits that the highest 
attainment—the Buddhist salvation—is a form of cessation. In 
fact, the terms anåtman and nirvåˆa are even negative from a 
grammatical point of view (the former with the negative prefix an-, 
and the latter with the negative prefix nir-). While the analysis of 
meaning does not necessarily rest on the grammar of the terms 
under consideration, when one turns to more technical Buddhist 
accounts of these doctrines, again we see that their negative 
character is brought to the fore. 
Considering the doctrine of anåtman, it is of course a 
central Buddhist doctrine that there is no eternal, unchanging 
metaphysical substratum corresponding to conventional notions of 
the self; the continuity of rebirth is accounted for in terms of 
interrelated processes of momentary events comprised of the five 
aggregates (form, feeling, etc.), which themselves have no 
permanence. This point is emphasized in the so-called “unanswered 
questions,” a set of questions which the Buddha refused to address. 
Among these are the questions of whether after death the Tathågata 
                                                                                                              
despotic East” (2008: 45). Others also view Hegel’s interpretation of 
Buddhism as a projected counterpart to Hegel’s own philosophy; e.g., 
Morton states that Hegel “is unable to jettison Buddhism, even while he is 
criticizing it, for it provides some key elements of his models of thinking” 
(2007: 3). 
14  Some interpreters have been drawn to the similarities between Hegel and 
Buddhism. While that is not our focus, see Kim 2006 and Scarfe 2006 for 
recent examples. Brief overviews are offered by Conze 1963, Dumoulin 
1981, and Wilhelm 1961. Kim had discussed similarities between Hegel and 
Buddhism more than half a century ago, and described the noted Japanese 
philosopher KitarØ Nishida (1870-1945) as “a Hegelian who incorporated 
Zen thinking into his system” (1955: 25). 
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(the Buddha) can be said to exist, to not exist, to both exist and not 
exist, or to neither exist nor not exist.15 The Buddha responds by 
stating that “the Tathågata has abandoned that material form by 
which one describing the Tathågata might describe him; he has cut 
it off at the root, made it like a palm stump, done away with it so 
that it is no longer subject to future arising…The Tathågata has 
abandoned that feeling…perception…[mental] formations…[and] 
consciousness” (Ñåˆamoli and Bodhi 1995: 593-594). Hence all 
five aggregates have been cut off by the Buddha at death, including 
consciousness: “The Tathågata is liberated from reckoning in terms 
of consciousness” (Ñåˆamoli and Bodhi 1995: 594). As Collins 
explains, the problem with the unanswered questions is clear from 
a Buddhist perspective: “Conceptually they rest on the mistaken 
assumption that a real entity exists as a referent for terms such as 
‘Tathågata,’ ‘being,’ and the like” (1982: 135). According to 
Buddhism, there simply is no substantially existing self. 
In the vast domain of Buddhist discourse many differing 
conceptions of nirvåˆa have been articulated, sometimes in 
opposition to the doctrines of other texts and schools. For example, 
from a survey of Buddhist doctrinal treatises, La Vallée Poussin 
(1929: 670-671) identifies the following four types of nirvåˆa: (1) 
naturally pure nirvåˆa from beginningless time (anådikålika-
prak®ti-ßuddha-nirvåˆa), which refers to the fundamental state of 
peace of all phenomena due to their being without any inherent 
nature; (2) nirvåˆa with residual conditioning (sopadhißeΣa-
nirvåˆa), which refers to the state of having eliminated all forms of 
mental affliction during one’s final rebirth; (3) nirvåˆa without 
residual conditioning (nirupadhißeΣa-nirvåˆa), which refers to the 
attainment of an unconditioned state after one’s final rebirth has 
ended; and (4) non-abiding nirvåˆa (apratiΣ†hita-nirvåˆa), a 
particularly Mahåyåna conception, which refers to a form of 
nirvåˆa wherein there is no abiding in either saµsåra (cyclic 
existence) or nirvåˆa.16 Certain Mahåyåna texts, considering the 
third form, nirvåˆa without residual conditioning, to be the 
ultimate goal of the “H¥nayåna,” characterize that form of nirvåˆa 
                                                 
15  See, e.g., the Aggivacchagotta Sutta in the Majjhima Nikåya (Ñåˆamoli and 
Bodhi 1995). 
16  These four are also listed in the Mahåvyutpatti, a compendium of Sanskrit 
and Tibetan terms from ca. the early ninth century, although there the first 
member of the list is simply nirvåˆa. 
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in completely negative terms, as a form of utter cessation, 
termination, or non-existence.17 But such entirely negative 
characterizations of nirvåˆa do not only occur in Mahåyåna 
critiques of the “H¥nayåna.” For example, in the Abhidharmakoßa-
bhåΣya the famous scholar-monk Vasubandhu states that according 
to the Sautråntika school, “Nirvåˆa is pure non-existence.”18 So 
while nirvåˆa is by no means consistently interpreted as entirely 
negative in Buddhist discourse, negative characterizations of this 
important Buddhist doctrine may indeed be found. 
Turning from these two basic Buddhist doctrines to broader 
concerns, it is commonly known that according to one standard 
self-description, Buddhism is the “middle way,” steering a course 
between a number of pairs of extremes that are to be avoided. One 
significant pair of extremes in this regard is eternalism 
(ßåßvatavåda) and annihilationism (ucchedavåda), respectively, the 
view that the self is eternal and the view that an existent self is 
completely extinguished at death.19 Interestingly, Buddhist thinkers 
are sometimes at pains to distinguish their own perspective from 
that of the annihilationists, or “nihilists,” and in fact have often 
been charged with nihilism by their Brahmanical opponents. In the 
AlagaddËpama Sutta, the Buddha himself states, “I have been 
baselessly, vainly, falsely, and wrongly misrepresented by some 
recluses and brahmins thus: ‘The recluse Gotama is one who leads 
astray; he teaches the annihilation, the destruction, the 
extermination of an existing being’” (Ñåˆamoli and Bodhi 1995: 
234). The charges of nihilism, however, were not easy to dismiss, 
and would continue to be raised against various forms of 
Buddhism. 
In a particularly relevant section from his commentary on 
Någårjuna’s MËlamadhyamaka-kårikå, the Madhyamaka scholar-
monk Candrak¥rti engages with an imaginary interlocutor on the 
question of whether Buddhism (or Candrak¥rti’s Madhyamaka 
Buddhism) is not in fact really just a form of nihilism.20 
                                                 
17  E.g., MahåyånasËtrålaµkåra-bhåΣya ad 3.3. 
18  La Vallée Poussin 1991, vol. 1, p. 285; for a discussion of this section of the 
text, see Kritzer 2003: 339-341. 
19  See Ñåˆamoli and Bodhi 1995, pp. 229-231 for a statement of this 
distinction in the Majjhima Nikåya. 
20  The discussion may be found at La Vallée Poussin 1903-1913, pp. 368-369. 
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Candrak¥rti’s problems here arise out of a confusion in the central 
Madhyamaka conception of “emptiness” (ßËnyatå), according to 
which all phenomena are without an inherent nature—another 
important Buddhist doctrine with a rather negative tinge. Our aims 
here are not to enter into debates regarding the proper 
interpretation of this central Madhyamaka doctrine,21 but merely to 
highlight the sense in which Buddhism does seem to “tarry with the 
negative.” Furthermore, it is significant that the Madhyamaka 
conception of emptiness was considered even by some fellow 
Mahåyåna Buddhists to move a bit too closely to a form of 
nihilism, as evidenced by the Yogåcåra reconception of this 
doctrine.22 What sense is to be made of all this negative talk? Was 
Hegel, after all, right? Is Buddhism simply a form of nihilism? 
It must be pointed out, of course, that there is a positive 
side to Buddhist doctrine as well. Not all conceptions of nirvåˆa 
characterize it as non-existence. In fact, most commonly, nirvåˆa 
is simply described as unconditioned (asaµsk®ta). And in the 
Nibbåna Sutta (in the Udåna, considered to be among the earliest 
Buddhist scriptures), nirvåˆa is said to exist: “There is, monks, an 
unborn, unbecome, unmade, unfabricated” (Thanissaro 1994). 
Collins also states that “certain positive-looking descriptions of the 
Tathågata” occur in the Theravåda Buddhist canon, including the 
statement that “the Buddha both before and after death is 
‘immeasurable like the vast ocean’” (1982: 135-136). In the realm 
of Mahåyåna discourse, there are further positive characterizations 
of the ultimate. Even the Madhyamaka Buddhist thinker Bhavya—
arguing that “‘Brahman’ [i.e., the absolute in Hinduism]…if 
properly understood, could be equated with Nirvåˆa”—claims that 
great Mahåyåna bodhisattvas “adore [Brahman] by the method of 
non-adoration” (Gokhale 1962: 274-275). And in the fully-
                                                 
21  Tuck 1990 offers an overview of western interpretations of Någårjuna’s 
thought. 
22
  On the Yogåcåra reinterpretation of emptiness, see Nagao 1978 and Garfield 
2002; Garfield states that while for the Madhyamaka, emptiness means 
“emptiness of inherent existence” (svabhåva), for the Yogåcåra emptiness 
refers to “the emptiness of subject-object duality” (2002: 181-182). 
Buescher (2008: 173-176) discusses the early Yogåcåra critique of 
Madhyamaka thought as nihilist. The critique was to continue, and King 
(1994: 671) states that this “interpretation of the Madhyamaka position, that 
it is a form of nihilism, is a frequent cry of later Yogåcårins (e.g., 
Dharmapåla)”. 
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developed conceptions of buddhahood that occur in Mahåyåna 
treatises, the tide seems to turn towards a conception of 
buddhahood as the absolute, encompassing the whole of reality.23 
We believe, however, that the negative character of a 
number of significant Buddhist doctrines must still be taken 
seriously, that certain tendencies towards more positive 
formulations in Buddhism do not serve entirely as the “negative of 
the negative” (to use a Hegelian phrase). But what precisely is 
going on with all this negativity? Our response, in short, is that 
there is a strong apophatic tendency running throughout much of 
Buddhist discourse, that certain significant strands of Buddhist 
doctrine aim towards the removal of all views, all doctrines, indeed 
all concepts, as a means of attaining the realization of the ultimate 
spiritual goal.24 Gomez states, “Contrary to the customary 
insistence on ‘right views,’” one significant early Theravåda text 
“speaks of giving up all views” (1976: 140). Collins also argues 
that in Theravåda discourse one can note two ways in which 
Buddhism “seeks to counter what it sees as mistaken views”: one 
approach, “which might be described as quietistic, recommends 
exclusive concentration on religious practice, avoiding any 
speculative thought,” while another approach counters a mistaken 
view by putting forward “an opposing theory…which is correct: 
‘right view’” (1982: 87). The apophatic tendency that we are 
calling attention to here would correlate with what Collins refers to 
as the quietistic approach. This approach is exemplified by the 
well-known trope of Buddhist teaching as a raft, i.e., the teaching 
should be used for spiritual attainment, but should be left behind 
when it has served its purpose.25 In Madhyamaka thought, while 
the doctrine of emptiness certainly entails a negative ontological 
claim—namely that inherent nature does not exist—this should not 
be interpreted as nihilistic, or as a generalized denial of existence 
per se; furthermore, we would emphasize that the Madhyamaka 
doctrine of emptiness must be understood as having a 
soteriological aim. As Kapstein states, the Madhyamaka doctrine 
of emptiness “is sometimes said to dispense with all expressed 
tenets, even this one,” which may be interpreted as a “type of 
                                                 
23  On this interpretation, see Griffiths 1994. 
24  For an analysis of this specific Buddhist technique of apophasis in Peircean 
terms, see D’Amato 2008. 
25  See Collins 1982, pp. 120-123 for a discussion of this and relevant similes. 
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scepticism, specifically a sceptical view of the referential capacity 
of language and conceptual activity”; he goes on to point out that 
“‘emptiness’ cannot be understood primarily in propositional, or 
‘theoretical’ terms; rather it fundamentally determines one’s 
orientation to the Buddha’s salvific project” (2001, pp. 13-14). 
Hence, the doctrine of emptiness should also be viewed in terms of 
the apophatic tendency towards the removal of all views. Indeed, in 
the commentary referred to above, Candrak¥rti quotes a Mahåyåna 
sËtra which states that “emptiness is the exhaustion of all 
philosophical views. I call incurable whoever holds emptiness as a 
philosophical view” (Huntington 1989: 58). Also, in Yogåcåra 
thought, buddhahood is characterized in terms of a nonconceptual 
awareness (nirvikalpa-jñåna) which is to be cultivated through 
meditation, again emphasizing that the ultimate goal entails the end 
of all conceptual thought. Thus one significant technique of 
Buddhist practice is the removal of all barriers—including the 
removal of all views and concepts—which prevent one from 
directly apprehending the ultimate. 
In employing such apophatic techniques, however, 
Buddhism might be easily misinterpreted as entirely negative in 
character—if, for example, the technique of “giving up all views” 
is misread as a denial of all forms of existence. But is the 
“exhaustion of all philosophical views” equivalent to nihilism? Not 
necessarily, if the exhaustion of views is properly understood as a 
mode of apophasis, and not as a view denying existent entities (“I 
call incurable whoever holds emptiness as a philosophical view”!). 
In using techniques of apophasis, however, Buddhist discourse 
opens itself to the danger of being so misinterpreted. And it is not 
surprising that Hegel would view Buddhism in these negative 
terms, and characterize it as the “Religion of Annihilation,”26 
especially since similar critical characterizations were even brought 
forward by Buddhists against fellow Buddhists in the long and 
complex history of Buddhist discourse. While in the end, we do not 
believe that Buddhism is indeed entirely negative in character, or 
that Buddhism is the religion of nothingness, we do believe that 
because of the use of apophatic techniques, a nihilistic 
(mis)interpretation lurks close by—and that nihilism is the specter 
that must always be exorcised from Buddhist discourse. 
                                                 
26  See LPR II 735. 
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